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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two centuries emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) have increased sharply due to sustained 
economic growth, low cost of fossil fuels, deforestation and other land use changes. Growing above the 
natural absorption capacity of the earth eco-systems, GHGs emissions have been accumulated in the 
atmosphere reaching concentrations unprecedented for at least a million years. GHGs are indispensable 
because they keep the earth warm enough to support life as we know it: without GHGs the infrared solar 
radiation would escape the atmosphere and the earth temperature would be below 0°C. However, excessive 
concentrations lead to global warming and to a worldwide alteration of climate.
1 
 
The assessment of the social and economic impacts of moderate climate change (between 1.5°C – 3.5°C) is 
extremely complicated and far from being resolved. There will be gainers – those who live in relatively cold 
places – and losers – those who live in low-latitude, already warm poor countries. The aggregate balance is 
still not clear, but it will not necessarily be negative. A substantial increase of world mean temperature (at 
+5°C for example) would instead very likely generate irreversible, potentially catastrophic climate 
disruptions. This concern is shared by virtually all the scientific community and it is at the core of the 
motivations that support international action to stabilize GHGs concentrations at safe levels (Weitzman, 
2009). 
 
Until recently, the focus of studies on optimal mitigation strategies has been on overall macroeconomic 
costs. Often overlooked are instead the implications of mitigation policies in terms of investments needed to 
support the required low-carbon transformations of the economies. Despite being two sides of the same coin, 
costs and investments inform on two very different aspects of climate policy and should not be confused. 
 
Investments are expenditures to increase productive capital. Investments imply a financial transfer from one 
agent to another, from one sector of the economy to another sector, or from one generation to the next. If 
investments are re-distributed among capital assets that have the same productivity (i.e. that yield the same 
output per unit of investment), there is a re-distribution of resources from one sector to another, but the level 
of macroeconomic activity is not affected. Macroeconomic costs arise only when investments are 
redistributed from more productive uses to less productive uses. This loss of productivity generates a lower 
level of output, which is the true net cost for the economy as a whole. 
 
Unfortunately, it is frequent to find studies that do not distinguish clearly between investments and costs. In 
particular, investments are often referred to as costs of the climate policy (see for instance: IEA, 2008, p. 
487; Russ et al, 2009; European Commission, SEC(2009) 1172, p. 4, Table 2; a notable exception is 
UNFCCC, 2007). 
 
Pure financial flows are transfers that do not result in productive capital investments. In the case of climate 
policy, transactions on the carbon markets, both at domestic and international level, are financial flows. Also 
revenues from carbon taxes are financial flows. 
 
There is now a wide agreement on the fact that, not counting environmental benefits, mitigation policy 
indeed diverts resources from less expensive to more expensive ways of generating and using energy. 
Advocates of win-win solutions to climate change dispute this result and support the idea that, by reducing 
inefficiencies of the economy other than the environment, climate policy might actually have overall 
macroeconomic benefits. This will probably be true for some sectors and in some periods of time but very 
few studies show that this would hold at aggregate level and over a long time horizon. Therefore, climate 
policy is almost unanimously considered to be costly over the long-run.
2 
                                                 
1 See work of the Working Group I of the IPCC (i.e. Solomon et al, 2007) for a thorough treatment of the science of 
climate change. 
2 The Energy Modelling Forum 22 has produced estimates of mitigation costs at global and regional level using a 
variety of models and under different assumptions on participation and timing of abatement efforts (Clarke et al, 2010).   3
While the literature on mitigation policy costs has grown considerably during the past fifteen years, the 
implication of climate policy on investment patterns and on financial flows are still not widely explored. This 
paper tackles exactly this issue. It contributes to a recent literature whose main concern is to estimate the 
investments needed to finance the low-carbon transformation of the economies. A key question in this 
literature is whether the amount and timing of investments are such to require a specific government 
intervention to support the private sector. 
 
We focus here on mitigation policy alone, leaving aside considerations on the financial needs for adaptation 
to climate change. Our work is grounded on scenarios of long-term climate policy produced by the hybrid 
integrated assessment model WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid), developed at Fondazione 
Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
3 In particular, we look at financial requirements to transform the power sector 
and to scale-up Research and Development (R&D) activities in the energy sector. Investments in the power 
sector are endogenous in the model, as it is overall electricity and energy demand and fuels prices. Regarding 
R&D activities, the focus of WITCH on endogenous technical change makes possible to provide original 
insights on their dynamics. 
 
We assess investment trajectories on a time horizon that stretches up to 2050, a year now widely used to set 
intermediate stabilization targets, and we assess when criticalities will likely emerge along this time path. In 
order to draw policy insights, we compare the required financial efforts to previous large scale investment 
and R&D projects. 
 
Other very relevant questions concern the size of the financial flows associated to carbon pricing and the 
implications of climate policy on the international crude oil market. Climate policy will basically consist in 
establishing a price for carbon, a commodity that has not been priced so far and thus “used” in excess. The 
price of carbon can be imposed either by a tax, or it will emerge from the exchange of emissions allowances 
in a cap-and-trade scheme, or by a mix of these approaches. In any case, carbon will become a major world 
commodity and will generate enormous financial flows, at both domestic and international level. At the same 
time, the international crude oil market will tend to disappear because oil will be used minimally in a low-
carbon world. Financial transactions associated to the oil market will tend to shrink even further because oil 
price will likely diminish from the present level. This study will assess the implications of this historical 
change. 
 
The mitigation policy scenario that we use aims at stabilizing GHGs concentrations at 550 parts per million 
(ppm) of CO2-equivalent (CO2-eq) at 2105. This level of concentrations will generate, as an IPCC best 
estimate, a temperature change of 2.9°C, approximately one degree higher than the 2°C goal advocated in the 
international climate policy arena (IPCC AR4, WG I, Ch 10, Table 10.8; see Meehl et al, 2009). It must be 
considered that in order to attain the 2°C target at least with a fifty percent chance, it would be necessary to 
stabilize concentrations at about 450 ppm CO2-eq over the same time horizon, when concentrations have 
already reached about 430 ppm CO2-eq. This is politically extremely ambitious and technically almost 
impossible to achieve (see Carraro and Massetti, 2009). We thus focus on the 550 ppm CO2-eq concentration 
level (which corresponds roughly to a 450 CO2 only level), a more sensitive climate policy target.
4 
 
Compared to the large number of analyses on the cost of climate policy, there are relatively few studies that 
assess the implications of stabilization policy for investments and financial transfers (see Table 1 for a 
summary). The first attempt to quantify financial requirements of mitigation policies is probably from the 
UNFCCC secretariat. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
For a recent study of mitigation policy costs at European level see the RECIPE Project (Edenhofer et al 2009). For an 
analysis of mitigation policy costs using the WITCH model see for example Bosetti et al (2009c). 
3 See Bosetti, et al (2006), Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni (2007) and Bosetti et al (2009e) for a detailed description of the 
WITCH model. 
4 The level of CO2-eq concentrations was 430 ppm in 2005. If we consider that from 1995 to 2005, CO2 concentrations 
alone have grown at the pace of 1.9 ppm per year, we see how little room there is for further emissions. In order to 
achieve the 450 ppm target the world as a whole must bring GHGs emissions to zero in little more than a decade or to 
rely on highly speculative technologies that would be capable of generating net negative emissions on a very large 
scale.   4
Table 1 Summary of models 
UNFCCC ENV-LINKAGE/OECD 2100 550 ppm CO2 eq no UNFCCC (2007)
RECIPE IMACLIM-R/REMIND-R/WITCH 2100 500-550 ppm CO2 eq
† yes Edenhofer et al. (2009)
450 ppm CO2 eq
550 ppm CO2 eq
IPTS-JCR GEM3/POLES 2050 Multiple
‡ yes Russ et al. (2009)
McKinsey Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve v2.0
* 2030 480 ppm CO2 eq no McKinsey (2009)
WITCH WITCH 2100 550 ppm CO2-eq  yes
Notes:
(†) RECIPE considers a default stabilization target of 450 ppm CO2; depending on assumptions about emissions of other GHGs, this corresponds to overall GHG 
concentrations of 500–550 ppm CO2 eq.
(*) The Global GHG Abatement Cost Curve v2.0 is not a model, but rather a measure of technical opportunities to reduce emissions of GHGs at a cost of up to 60€ per tCO2 
eq of avoided emissions.
(‡) The target of the “Central Scenario” is defined on the basis of a set of 4 indicators: the group of developed countries have a -30% target compared to 1990 in 2020, 
whereas the emissions of developing countries in 2020 are limited to 20% below the baseline emissions.
World Energy Model IEA no IEA (2008) 2030




In 2007 the UNFCCC has defined a reference and a mitigation scenario for GHGs emissions using a variety 
of models and projections.
5 The report defined both investment flow as the initial (capital) spending for a 
physical asset and financial flow as an ongoing expenditure related to climate change mitigation or 
adaptation that does not involve investment in physical assets. In particular, it estimated that additional 
investment and financial flows of USD 200–210 billion would be necessary to return CO2-eq emissions to 
current levels (2004) by 2030.
6 This path of emissions is coherent with a stabilization target of 550 ppm 
CO2-eq at the end of the century. Focusing on the energy sector, the mitigation scenario requires less 
investment in the production of fossil fuels and associated facilities, and substantial shifts of investments 
within the power sector. Under the mitigation scenario, investment in energy supply infrastructure is 
projected to be USD 695 billion in 2030, USD 67 billion (9 per cent) less than under the reference scenario. 
Power supply requires more than USD 432 billion of investment under the mitigation scenario, USD 7 
billion (1.6 per cent) less than the reference scenario. Most of the increased investment is for large-scale 
deployment of CCS from 2020 onwards. Capital expenditure in fossil fuel supply would require USD 263 
billion under the mitigation scenario. Finally, more than half of all the energy investment needed worldwide 
is in developing countries due to their rapid economic growth. 
 
In the recent RECIPE study on low-carbon mitigation scenarios, conduced by three European research 
institutes, including FEEM with the WITCH model, investments in mitigation technologies to achieve a 450 
ppm CO2 concentration target would increase by USD 1200 billion by the middle of the century, while 
investments in conventional fossil fuels based sources of energy generation would be reduced by USD 300 to 
550 billion with respect to the reference scenario (Edenhofer et al, 2009). The largest slice of the pie would 
go to finance the deployment of renewable energy sources and to support the construction of power plants 
equipped with carbon capture and storage (CCS). The strength of the RECIPE project is that the estimates of 
additional investments on harmonized scenarios are produced by three well established integrated assessment 
models which encompass a rich set of options to describe economic and energy system dynamics, over a 
century-long time horizon. These three models are “optimization models”, in the sense that the dynamics of 
                                                 
5 For the reference scenario, Energy-related CO2 emissions were derived from the IEA World Energy Outlook (WEO) 
2006; non-CO2 emissions projections from the United States Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) extrapolated 
to 2030; current CO2 emissions due to land use, land-use change and forestry, and industrial process CO2 emissions 
projections from the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The ENV-Linkage model of the 
OECD is used to produce the reference and mitigation scenarios for investment and financial flows. The mitigation 
scenario consists of the energy-related CO2 emissions of the IEA WEO 2006 beyond the alternative policy case 
scenario; the non-CO2 emission reductions possible at a cost of less than USD 30 per tonne of CO2-eq as estimated by 
the US EPA; potential increases in sinks due to agriculture and forestry practices and potential industrial process CO2 
emission reductions estimated by WBCSD. UNFCCC secretariat (2007). 
6 Recently, the UNFCCC secretariat (2008) provided an update to the paper estimating that additional investment and 
financial flows needed are about 170 per cent higher, mainly due to higher projected capital costs, especially in the 
energy sector. UNFCCC secretariat (2008). “Investment and financial flows to address climate change: An update. 
Technical paper.” Available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/tp/07.pdf 
   5
the economy, and in particular of the energy sector, are the outcome of a throughout evaluation of different 
investment alternatives across sectors and time. Energy demand is not exogenous in these models, but rather 
an endogenous choice which reflects the relative cost of energy, especially when carbon emissions are priced 
severely in the ambitious stabilization scenarios. Higher energy costs trigger incentives to save energy and to 
reduce the amount of investments needed in the energy sector, compensating higher expenditure for more 
expensive energy technologies. 
 
For 550 ppm CO2-eq target (thus similar to the 450 CO2 only target of RECIPE) the International Energy 
Agency (IEA, 2008) estimates additional investments in the power sector to be equal to USD 1.2 trillion 
between 2010 and 2030. Investments in more efficient buildings and end-use technologies to increase energy 
efficiency amount to 3.0 trillion. The IEA also explores the more ambitious 450 ppm CO2, although it warns 
that the scale of the challenge to obtain this concentrations target is immense and it is uncertain whether it is 
technically achievable (IEA, 2008, p. 48). The amount of investments in the power sector to achieve this 
stricter target is equal to USD 3.6 trillion and 5.7 trillion needed to increase energy efficiency. The largest 
fraction of these investments, according to both scenarios, is required between 2020 and 2030. These results 
are obtained using the World Energy Model (WEM) of the IEA, a large scale mathematical modelling tool 
which draws information from observed trends in the past to project energy demand until 2030. Projections 
of investments are derived from the projected energy demand. The WEM is not a general equilibrium model 
and does not represent endogenously feedbacks from the energy system to the macro-economy. 
 
The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) of the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) has recently published a study that explores investment scenarios in the energy sector that are 
consistent with a long term 2°C target (Russ et al, 2009).
7 The European Commission has based on this study 
its recent communications on climate change policy (SEC(2009) 101, COM(2009) 475 and SEC(2009) 
1172). Five global mitigation scenarios have been analysed, which can lead to the 2°C objective. Under all 
scenarios in order to achieve the temperature target by 2020 developed countries as a group reduce their 
emissions by 30 per cent below 1990 levels and developing countries as a group limit emissions to 15 per 
cent to 30 per cent below the reference scenario. The scenarios were developed using a soft-linking multi-
sector general equilibrium model GEM-E3
8 and POLES a world energy sector simulation model.
9 
Macroeconomic implications were derived until 2020, while energy sector scenarios have been extended to 
2050. Interestingly, world cumulative investments in the power sector at 2020 do not increase and they 
decrease if cumulated up to 2030. The same pattern arises for the EU-27. For the larger group of all 
developed countries cumulative investments slightly increase in both periods; on the contrary, they decrease 
in developing countries. At first counter-intuitive, especially if compared to the IEA scenarios, these results 
are instead fully rational and bear an important insight: even if the average cost of new installed capacity in 
the power sector increases when carbon-intensive power plants are replaced by low-emissions ones, overall 
electricity demand shrinks faster, driven by energy efficiency improvement, and the overall investments in 
the power sector decline. It is hard to interpret instead the overall costs of the energy sector, estimated to be 
equal to 666 billion Euros, at 2005 prices, over the period 2013-2020. It is possible that these are investments 
rather than “true” costs. Nonetheless, it is not clear what would cause such increased spending, especially 
considering that the power sector would not require additional resources. Probably, the model predicts higher 
investments for the transport sector or an increase in efficiency in industrial and residential uses. 
Unfortunately, the lack of a detailed description of the methodology used to estimate total investments does 
not allow a thorough assessment of the whole set of European Commission position papers that use this 
study as a reference. 
 
McKinsey (2009) uses a peculiar approach based on GHGs abatement cost curves to represent abatement 
opportunities costing less than Euro 60 per tonne of CO2 (at 2005 prices). Remaining below this threshold, 
according to McKinsey, it is possible to abate GHGs emission 35 per cent with respect to 2030 or 70 per cent 
with respect to their business-as-usual scenario if aggressive action is implemented to adopt each single 
                                                 
7 The report is at the basis of the January 2009 European Commission Communication titled “Towards a comprehensive 
climate change agreement in Copenhagen”. 
8 For a description of the model: http://www.gem-e3.net/download/GEMmodel.pdf . 
9 Two models are soft-linked when they maintain they are run separately and the outcome of one is used as an input of 
the other in an iterative process that stops at convergence.   6
abatement opportunity. This is in line with a concentration target of roughly 480 ppm CO2-eq. In this study 
abatement costs are defined as annualized costs of different abatement measures in a given year per tonne of 
carbon saved, with respect to the business-as-usual technology. Comparing the cost of different abatement 
technologies allows to allocate investments efficiently. The McKinsey definition of costs is the technology-
level equivalent of the definition of macroeconomic cost we adopted in this paper. However, McKinsey costs 
do not include transaction costs as well as dynamic macro-economic effects which might be non-negligible 
especially for many low cost, diffused, emissions reductions opportunities. Investments represent the 
additional capital expenditure in the year when the abatement action is taken, relative to the business-as-
usual investment. Annual investments in abatement measures would be Euro 320 billion in 2015, Euro 530 
billion in 2020 and Euro 810 billion in 2030 (1.3 per cent of global GDP in 2030). Whereas the investments 
in 2030 for developed countries only represents 0.5-1.0 per cent of GDP, in developing countries this ratio 
increases to 1.2-3.5 per cent.
10 The 60 per cent of additional investments will be located in developing 
countries. 
 
Compared to the previous studies of investment trajectories under climate policy, this work stands out for a 
number of reasons. 
 
First, the WITCH model represents economic growth and technological progress dynamics with a greater 
realism than the other models used so far to assess investment dynamics. Economic growth is largely 
endogenous in WITCH and responds to the incentives to accumulate capital for productive uses. 
Technological progress in the energy sector is also endogenous in WITCH and it allows to study the 
incentive to invest in knowledge creation under climate policy. 
 
Second, WITCH is a truly dynamic model in which investment decisions are taken with perfect foresight. 
This means for example that carbon prices expected in the future affect present investment decisions in 
power plants. Also, the future benefit of a larger knowledge stock to invent energy efficient technologies is 
anticipated and motivates early investments in R&D.
11 
 
Third, energy sector dynamics are fully endogenous. Final energy demand depends on the (endogenous) 
relative prices of capital, labor and energy inputs. This is a key feature because it generates endogenously the 
optimal demand of energy under climate policy, unlike other models that need to assume an exogenous path 
for energy demand. Energy demand is also indirectly affected by endogenous investments in R&D to 
increase end-use energy efficiency. The optimal mix of power plants is endogenous and it is defined by a 
long-term assessment of the convenience to invest in different technologies. Fuels’ prices (oil, natural gas, 
coal and uranium) are endogenous and increase as cumulative extraction increases. 
 
Fourth, WITCH has a peculiar game-theoretic structure that allows to model non-cooperative interactions 
among countries. In the Reference scenario, twelve world regions interact non-cooperatively on the 
environment (GHGs emissions), fossil fuels, energy R&D, and on learning-by-doing in renewables. In the 
climate policy scenario regions are assumed to cooperate on the environment and a world carbon market is 
introduced to equate marginal abatement costs globally. Investment decisions in one region affect investment 
decisions in all other regions, at any point in time.
12 
 
WITCH is basically a game-theoretic, energy-focussed, variant of the well-known Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans 
optimal neoclassical growth model, widely used in economic growth theory to study investment dynamics 
trough time and across sectors. 
 
                                                 
10 The overall worldwide cost of abatement technologies is projected to be about Euro 150 billion per year by 2030; 
this figure does not include transaction and program costs of around Euro 40-200 billion generating a total cost Euro 
190-350 billion (less than 1% GDP). Global GDP is projected around USD 90 trillion by 2030, and the report use and 
exchange rate of 1.5 USD/EUR thought the analysis. 
11 There is not uncertainty and it is possible to perfectly foresee the environment – in terms of economic growth, 
population, price of inputs – in which investments decisions will be taken. 
12 For an analysis of the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions with WICTH see 
(Bosetti et al, 2009b).   7
The major pitfall of WITCH is the low detail in non-electric energy technologies. In particular, WITCH 
lacks a detailed set of end-use energy technologies and does not distinguishes among transport and 
residential energy uses. Accordingly, we cannot study investment dynamics in the non-electric sector. 
 
A final word of caution is necessary to interpret our findings. WITCH – as all other Integrated Assessment 
Models – is designed to produce scenarios and not forecasts. Investments scenarios are certainly accurate and 
the model is sufficiently well calibrated to produce a picture of the energy sector that, in the Reference 
scenario, is very close to the short term energy outlooks of the IEA and of the Energy Information 
Administration (Massetti and Parrado, 2009). However, the aim of the model is to show the major forces at 
play and how investment dynamics change when climate policy is introduced. This increases our 
understanding of how economies would optimally respond to climate policy. 
 
We start presenting a Reference scenario in which we assume that during the next century there will be no 
climate policy. In Section 3 and 4 the Reference scenario will be used to investigate the changes in the 
optimal mix of investments in the power sector and in R&D induced by climate policy. In Section 5 we 
present scenarios that show how climate policy marks the rise of carbon finance and the decline of fossil 
fuels markets. 
 
2. From Carbon Intensive to Carbon-Free Energy Systems 
 
2.1. A Quick Overview of the WITCH Model 
 
WITCH – World Induced Technical Change Hybrid – is a regional integrated assessment model structured to 
provide normative information on the optimal responses of world economies to climate damages (Bosetti et 
al. 2006, 2009e; Bosetti, Massetti and Tavoni, 2007). 
 
It is a hybrid model because it combines features of both top-down and bottom-up modelling: the top-down 
component consists of an inter-temporal optimal growth model in which the energy input of the aggregate 
production function has been integrated into a bottom-up like description of the energy sector. WITCH’s 
top-down framework guarantees a coherent, fully intertemporal allocation of investments, including those in 
the energy sector. 
 
World countries are aggregated in twelve regions on the basis of geographic, economic and technological 
vicinity (see the Appendix for more detail on the regional aggregation) which interact strategically on global 
externalities: greenhouse gases, technological spillovers, a common pool of exhaustible natural resources. 
 
WITCH contains a detailed representation of the energy sector, which allows the model to produce a 
reasonable characterization of future energy and technological scenarios and an assessment of their 
compatibility with the goal of stabilizing greenhouse gases concentrations. In addition, by endogenously 
modelling fuel prices (oil, coal, natural gas, uranium), as well as the cost of storing the CO2 captured, the 
model can be used to evaluate the implication of mitigation policies on the energy system in all its 
components. 
 
In WITCH emissions arise from fossil fuels used in the energy sector and from land use changes that release 
carbon sequestered in biomasses and soils. Emissions of CH4, N2O, SLF (short-lived fluorinated gases), LLF 
(long-lived fluorinated) and SO2 aerosols, which have a cooling effect on temperature, are also identified. 
Since most of these gases are determined by agricultural practices, the modelling relies on estimates for 
reference emissions, and a top-down approach for mitigation supply curves.
13 
                                                 
13 Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) is estimated to offer sizeable low-cost abatement 
potential. WITCH includes a baseline projection of land use CO2 emissions, as well as estimates of the global potential 
and costs for reducing emissions from deforestation, assuming that all tropical forest nations can join an emission   8
 
A climate module governs the accumulation of emissions in the atmosphere and the temperature response to 
growing GHGs concentrations. WITCH is also equipped with a damage function that provides the feedback 
on the economy of global warming. However, in this study we exclude the damage function and we take the 
so-called “cost-minimization” approach: given a target in terms of GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere, 
we produce scenarios that minimize the cost of achieving this target. 
 
Endogenous technological dynamics are a key feature of WITCH. Dedicated R&D investments increase the 
knowledge stock that governs energy efficiency. Learning-by-doing curves are used to model cost dynamics 
for wind and solar capital costs. Both energy-efficiency R&D and learning exhibit international spillovers. 
Two backstop technologies – one in the electricity sector and the other in the non-electricity sector  – 
necessitate dedicated innovation investments to become competitive. In line with the most recent literature, 
the costs of these backstop technologies are modelled through a so-called two-factor learning curve, in which 
their price declines both with investments in dedicated R&D and with technology diffusion. 
 
The base year is 2005 for calibration; all monetary values are in constant 2005 USD. The WITCH model 
uses market exchange rates for international income comparisons. 
 
Table 2 Economic variables and major indicators trends in the Reference and Policy scenarios. 
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Population (billions)
World 6.5 6.9 7.7 8.3 8.8 9.2 6.5 6.9 7.7 8.3 8.8 9.2
O E C D 1 . 11 . 11 . 11 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 2 1 . 11 . 11 . 11 . 21 . 21 . 2
N o n  O E C D 5 . 45 . 86 . 57 . 1 7 . 6 8 . 0 5 . 45 . 86 . 57 . 17 . 68 . 0
Gross World Product (trillions)
World 44 53 75 102 133 169 44 53 74 100 130 162
OECD 35 40 51 62 74 86 35 40 51 62 72 83
Non OECD 10 13 24 39 59 83 10 13 24 38 58 80
Total Primary Energy Supply (EJ)
World 429 474 577 675 760 831 429 455 498 518 498 467
OECD 206 226 256 277 290 300 206 213 220 217 197 175
Non OECD 223 249 321 398 469 531 223 242 278 301 301 292
Electricity Demand (TWH)
World 17,954 20,308 27,092 34,930 43,315 51,867 17,954 19,209 22,751 26,487 29,851 33,736
OECD 10,159 11,215 13,560 15,755 17,856 19,894 10,159 10,427 11,638 12,937 14,139 15,609
Non OECD 7,795 9,093 13,532 19,175 25,459 31,973 7,795 8,782 11,113 13,550 15,712 18,127
Energy Intensity of Output (index, base year 2005)
World 1.00 0.92 0.80 0.68 0.59 0.51 1.00 0.88 0.69 0.53 0.40 0.30
OECD 1.00 0.95 0.84 0.74 0.66 0.58 1.00 0.90 0.73 0.59 0.46 0.36
Non OECD 1.00 0.82 0.58 0.44 0.34 0.28 1.00 0.80 0.51 0.34 0.23 0.16
Carbon Intensity of Energy (index, base year 2005)
World 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.06 1.09 1.12 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.84 0.69 0.55
OECD 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.04 1.07 1.09 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.77 0.61 0.45
Non OECD 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.07 1.10 1.14 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.89 0.75 0.61
Reference Scenario Policy Scenario
 
2.2. The Reference Scenario 
 
In the Reference scenario we assume that there is no policy to reduce global warming. Countries behave non-
cooperatively on the global commons. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
trading system and have the capacity to implement REDD programs. However, avoided deforestation is not a source of 
emissions reductions in the version of the model that we used for this study.   9
Total primary energy demand grows over the whole first half of the century in the Reference scenario, 
fuelled by population and economic growth (Table 2) and by abundant, relatively inexpensive, fossil fuels 
(Table 3). Most of the increment of energy demand is expected to come from Non OECD countries, in 
particular from fast-growing Asian emerging economies. Electricity demand grows at a faster pace than total 
primary energy supply, revealing a long-term increment of both the absolute and relative weight of the power 
sector in satisfying energy needs. 
 
Table 3 Fossil fuels, emissions and climate trends in the Reference and Policy scenarios. 
2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2005 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Coal Consumption (EJ)
World 122 167 262 351 427 491 122 146 179 -218 104 28
OECD 54 72 99 116 127 133 54 58 59 37 -2 -43
Non OECD 68 95 163 234 301 358 68 88 119 -256 106 71
Oil Consumption (EJ)
World 158 181 222 253 277 294 158 179 207 193 141 87
OECD 90 99 110 115 116 116 90 98 103 84 55 30
Non OECD 68 82 112 139 161 178 68 81 103 109 85 58
Natural Gas Consumption (EJ)
World 92 112 136 153 163 167 92 111 127 121 97 74
OECD 47 54 60 63 63 62 47 54 58 52 39 29
Non OECD 45 58 76 90 100 106 45 56 69 69 57 45
Price of Fossil Fuels
Coal /$ / Short Ton) 54 55 57 59 63 67 54 55 56 58 59 61
O i l  ( $  /  B a r r e l ) 6 06 27 28 7 1 0 6 1 2 9 6 06 67 78 89 28 9
Natural Gas ($ / Cubic Feet) 0.0077 0.0073 0.0080 0.0093 0.0111 0.0134 0.0077 0.0073 0.0080 0.0091 0.0102 0.0111
CO2 Emissions From Fossil Fuels (GtonCO2)
W o r l d 2 93 24 04 85 56 2 2 93 03 22 92 31 7
OECD 14 15 18 19 21 22 14 14 13 11 8 5
Non OECD 15 17 22 28 35 40 15 16 18 18 15 12
GHG Emissions (GtonCO2-eq)
W o r l d 4 64 95 86 87 88 6 4 64 74 84 53 93 3
OECD 16 18 21 22 24 25 16 16 16 13 10 7
Non OECD 29 31 38 46 54 62 29 31 32 32 29 27
Concentrations of CO2 (ppm)
380 391 417 449 484 524 380 391 413 433 447 454
Concentrations of GHG (ppm CO2-eq)
427 444 484 534 593 660 427 443 475 504 526 540
Temperature (°C above pre-industrial level)
0.76 0.88 1.14 1.42 1.72 1.89 0.76 0.88 1.13 1.39 1.62 1.74
Reference Scenario Policy Scenario
 
Although still voracious in total energy demand, the economies become more energy efficient, according to 
the Reference scenario. In particular, the contraction of the energy intensity of output is stronger in Non 
OECD countries, which start from relatively high inefficiencies. Carbon intensity of energy is increasing in 
both OECD and Non OECD countries, due to a growing use of coal in power generation. Coal remains the 
cheapest option to fuel power plants for the whole century and the gap with the other fossil fuels increases as 
time goes by (see Table 3). Accordingly, the share of coal over total fossil fuels demand increases from 33 
per cent in 2005 to 52 per cent in 2050 (see Table 3). 
   10
The large expansion of total primary energy supply, and the relatively faster expansion of coal – the fuel with 
the highest content of carbon per unit of energy – explains the continued growth of CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuels. The absence of any policy to contain CO2 emissions from other sectors explains the overall 
expansion of CO2 concentrations from 380 ppm to 524 ppm: an average increment of 2.88 ppm per year, 
substantially higher than the average 1.99 ppm per year from 1995 to 2005 (IPCC, AR4; see Forster et al 
2007). As a consequence temperature increases 1.9 °C above the pre-industrial (Table 3).
14 
 
2.3. The Policy Scenario 
 
In the Policy scenario GHGs concentrations are forced to remain below 550 ppm CO2-eq at the end of the 
century. The global pattern of emissions imposed is the result of a cost-benefit solution of the model under 
the assumption of a world social planner. Climate policy is assumed to be stringent from 2010. GHGs 
emissions peak in 2020 at 48 Gton CO2-eq; emissions from fossil fuels also peak in 2020 and then decline by 
40 per cent with respect to 2005 in 2050 and by 72 per cent with respect to the Reference scenario. 
 
The policy tool is a global cap-and-trade scheme in which allowances are distributed according to the 
contraction-and-convergence (CC) rule: in 2010 permits are first distributed in proportion to present 
emissions and then progressively converge to a full equal-per-capita allocation scheme in 2050. Banking and 
borrowing of emissions allowances are not allowed, but there is no restriction to international trade of 
permits
15. We name this policy scenario 550 ppm CC. 
 
We work in an ideal framework in which we assume full immediate co-operation among countries and a 
globally efficient allocation of abatement effort. Despite offering an optimistic view of future international 
climate policy and carbon markets, with these assumptions we avoid overly complex scenarios and we are 
able to present a benchmark case against which more realistic policy and market settings can be assessed.
16 
 
Table 2 shows that the 550 ppm CC scenario strengthens the efficiency improvements of the Reference 
scenario and reverts the trend of carbon intensity of energy. Energy efficiency is a major area of action to cut 
GHGs emissions, especially in the first decades. However, the decarbonization is a necessity and more costly 
investments have to be realized. 
 
Total primary energy supply declines sharply with respect to the Reference scenario and in 2050 it remains 
almost unchanged with respect to 2010 after peaking in 2030. Oil and natural gas consumption decline 
quickly, both in OECD and Non OECD regions, with respect to the Reference scenario and with respect to 
the base year. The use of coal declines in the first decade and then it increases due to the expansion of coal 
power plants with CCS. In fact, coal – thanks to CCS – is the only fossil fuel not to decline with respect to 
present consumption levels. 
 
Climate policy is costly according to WITCH. Investments are necessarily directed towards more expensive 
technologies, energy efficiency investments and the necessary input reallocation drive the economies away 
from their most productive resource allocation choices. Discounted global costs are equal to 3 per cent of 




                                                 
14 In the Reference scenario GHGs concentrations in the atmosphere reaches 998ppm CO2-eq in 2100, with a 
temperature increase above the pre-industrial level of 3.75°C. 
15 For the consequences of introducing banking see Bosetti, Carraro and Massetti (2009a). Scenarios with restrictions to 
trade of carbon permits are presented in Section 4. 
16 It must be noted, however, that climate architectures which contemplate delayed actions or limits to key low-carbon 
technologies will, with high probability, jeopardize the achievement of the 550 ppm target (Edenhofer et al, 2009; 
Clarke et al, 2010).   11
3. Transforming the Power Sector 
 
It is often believed that mitigation policies will require a much higher level of investments in the power 
sector (Table 1). In fact, zero or low-carbon generation technologies have investment costs per unit of 
installed capacity higher than the traditional coal or gas fired power plants that they are meant to replace. 
Were all the electricity demand of the Reference scenario to be supplied by low-carbon technologies, the 
total amount of investments in the power sector would certainly increase. However, this is not necessarily 
true. In fact, one of the cheapest ways to reduce carbon emissions is to increase overall energy efficiency, 
reducing also electricity demand with respect to the Reference scenario (Table 2). There are thus two forces 
at play: more technologically advanced power plants will increase the investment cost per unit of installed 
capacity, but at the same time overall installed capacity will decline as a result of contraction in electricity 
demand. We find these effects to be roughly equivalent at global level. As a result, the financial requirements 
of the power sector do not change significantly when climate policy is implemented (Table 4). 
 
Table 4 
(a) Investment as % of total investment by type 
      Reference scenario  550 ppm CC scenario 












2005     96.46  3.46  0.08  96.78  3.11  0.11 
2030     97.07  2.85  0.04  96.75  3.10  0.05 
2050     97.58  2.34  0.02  97.28  2.53  0.03 
(b) Cumulative total investment by region, 2005-2050: 550 ppm CC - Reference scenario 
(Billion 2005 USD) 



















USA  -39 -47 -583 -2043 -4603 -669 -6646 -7315 
EUROPE 3  25  -361  -1390  -3085  -333  -4475  -4808 
Other  OECD -14 -10 -135 -748 -1715 -159 -2463 -2622 
Total OECD  -50  -31  -1080  -4180  -9403  -1161  -13583  -14744 
China -36  -285  -543  -1681  -3401  -864  -5082  -5945 
Transition 
Economies  -21 -60  -53  -95  -602 -133 -697  -830 
Other Non 
OECD  -59.03 -461.19  -1254.55 -4401.13 -8844.94 -1774.77  -13246.07  -15020.84 
Total Non 
OECD  -59  -461  -1255  -4401  -8845  -1775  -13246  -15021 
Total  World -116 -805 -1850 -6177 -12848  -2771 -19025 -21796 
 
 
The fact that financial requirements of the power sector do not change significantly suggests that investing in 
a low-carbon power sector is perfectly feasible from a macroeconomic standpoint. Financial resources 
needed to transform electricity generation will not crowd out investments in other sectors, at least in the 
long-run. The competition for funds will not be between the power sector and other sectors, but rather inside 
the power sector, between low-carbon and fossil-fuels electricity generation technologies. Forward looking 
investors, with perfect information, realize that investments in coal fired power plants – which have an 
expected lifetime of about forty years – are risky due to the high price of carbon that will emerge around 
2050 (Figure 6). Accordingly, they decide to wait and invest in low-carbon electricity generation projects as 
soon as they become available. They also decide to reduce investments because they perfectly anticipate that 
the demand of electricity will decline as a consequence of climate policy. The behavior of these forward 
looking agents, despite being a caricature of real-world investors, suggests that the resources invested in the 
power sector will depend both on the cost of new technologies and on the power sector size. Therefore, 
models that do not represent autonomous re-adjustment of electricity demand over-estimate the amount of 
investments needed in the power sector. 
   12
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Reference 550 ppm CC 550 ppm with constraints  
Figure 1 Total investment in the power sector: World, OECD and Non OECD countries, 2005-2050. 
 
The fact that climate policy does not change significantly the allocation of resources towards the power 
sector is confirmed by an analysis of the investment flows direction (see Table 4). The balance between 
investments in power and non-power capital is practically unaltered in the 550 ppm CC scenario with respect 
to the Reference scenario, with the power sector absorbing about 3 per cent of total investments. A radical 
change is instead necessary to finance R&D in new technologies to decarbonize energy supply and to 
increase energy efficiency. The massive increment of R&D spending required by a stringent mitigation 
policy deserves a careful analysis to which we devote Section 4. 
   13
Although cumulative global investments in the power sector remain unchanged, some important changes 
occur in the distribution across time, across power generation technologies and across regions. 
 






















































Hydro Coal Oil Natural Gas Renewables Nuclear Coal IGCC  
Figure 2: Total investment in the power sector 2005-2050, by production technology. 
 
If we consider the time pattern of investments, our data suggest that the mitigation policy requires additional 
investments only for a quarter of a century, from 2020 until 2045; after 2045, the optimal level of 
investments in the 550 ppm CC scenario converges to the one of the Reference scenario (Figure 1). A look at 
regional patterns shows that investments in OECD countries will be higher in the 550 ppm CC scenario from 
2015 until 2050, while Non OECD regions will reduce investments from 2010 to 2025 and also from 2040 
until 2050. This different behavior is explained by higher space for energy efficiency improvements in Non 
OECD regions. 
 
Total investments in the power sector do not increase in the 550 ppm CC scenario with respect to the 
Reference scenario, but the decarbonisation of energy supply asks for a completely new energy mix and 
hence a radical re-organization of the power sector. Conventional fossil fuels power plants are progressively 
substituted by nuclear, coal power plants with CCS and renewables (Figure 2). 
 
The 550 ppm CC scenario requires a rapid reallocation of investments in power generation technologies. By 
2020 it is optimal to stop investing in traditional coal power plants: coal can be used only if power plants are 
equipped with CCS. Nuclear becomes attractive in a carbon-constrained world. Soon after climate policy 
starts, the share of investments in these two technologies increases and becomes dominant from 2020 
onward. Natural gas remains competitive in the first years of climate policy, but then gradually disappears. 
Only oil-rich regions continue to invest in oil power plants, although less than in the Reference scenario. 
Investments in renewable power generation – such as photovoltaic and wind – increase progressively and 
tend to replace investments in coal with CCS by the middle of the century. Hydroelectric power capacity is 
assumed to be already fully exploited and follows an exogenous dynamic in the model. 
 
The joint analysis of Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggests that this quick reallocation of investments can be 
described as a succession of jumps. Fast-growing investments in nuclear power explain the first jump by 
2010. This is immediately followed by two shocks: the first due to the deployment of CCS technologies in 
2010 in OECD countries and the second, with a lag of ten years, in Non OECD countries. 
 
We increase the detail of our analysis by focussing on the investments in net power capacity additions, which 
exclude investments to replace obsolete power plants. The lower panel of Figure 3 shows that climate policy 
reduces the expansion of the power sector. It is interesting to examine the diverging pattern of investments 
and new capacity additions between 2020 and 2030: while the expansion of power capacity declines of about 
800 GW (which is equivalent to about 800 average-sized coal or nuclear power plants), the amount of 
investments increases. The average cost of power plants is thus increasing due to the penetration of nuclear, 
renewables and coal with CCS. These three technologies will basically cover all new capacity additions in a 
climate policy scenario because at 2050 electricity must be generated with almost zero carbon emissions. 
 
The rapid shift towards a new mix of electricity generation technologies will be the real challenge of climate 
policy for the power sector. These three technologies have serious drawbacks. Nuclear has controversial 
implications and might not be accepted by the public opinion. As for coal power plants with CCS, it is still   14
unclear if, and when, it will be possible to operate on a large scale. Finally, renewables have limitations due 
to low efficiency and grid connectivity problems. 
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Investment Capacity (Right Axis)  
Figure 3 World capacity additions and investment in power generation 2005-2030 
 
Even if financially manageable, the transition to a zero-carbon power sector will thus undoubtedly be 
problematic. In order to grasp the magnitude of the change, we propose a thought experiment in which power 
capacity can be expanded using either nuclear, hydroelectric or wind power plants. In the initial period 2005-
2030, it would be necessary to install each year either 20 nuclear plants (of 1,000 MW each), or 33 large 
hydro plants (of 1,000 MW each), or 18,490 wind turbines (of 3 MW each). If we extend the time horizon 
further in the future, until 2050, the requirement becomes impressive: in order to meet the extra capacity 75 
nuclear plants, or 126 hydro plants, or 70,213 wind turbines, have to be installed each year (Figure 4). To 
make these figures even more real we provide some examples. In December 2009 there were 436 nuclear 
power plants in operation for a total net installed capacity of 370,000 MW. The Three Gorges Dam will   15
reach, when at full operation in 2011, 18,200 MW. In 2008 there was an estimated wind installed power 


















































































nuclear plants hydro plants wind turbines (Right Axis)  
Figure 4 Average number of new installations needed each year 
 
 
Investments are expected to shift across time, to move from fossil fuels based technologies to low- or zero-
carbon power plants and also across regions.  
 
Independently of the time span considered, the share of energy investments by Non OECD countries is lower 
in the 550 ppm CC scenario than in the Reference scenario and is bigger than the share of OECD countries 
(see Table 5). 
 
Looking more closely at the regional distribution of cumulative investments in the power sector it appears 
that the USA and the EU will sustain the long run investment cost of mitigation; in fact, the cumulative 
investment differential is negative for other countries (Figure 5). This effort is big, but affordable; for 
instance, the additional cumulative investment faced by the USA to tackle climate change would amount to 
USD 355.3 billion in 2050, an average yearly expense of USD 7.9 billion. This effort is comparable with the 
one US faced for one of the biggest infrastructure in the country, the Interstate Highway System, whose 
construction took 35 years (46,876 miles), representing an investment of USD 425 billion,
18 or an average 
annual investment of USD 12.1 billion. 
 
In conclusion a low-carbon world does not necessarily require higher investments, but rather a totally new 
mix of investments. This means that stresses will not come from funding problems, bur the main challenge 
will be to govern the reallocation of investment across different industries with the complex distributional 
consequences involved in the process. Also, criticalities will emerge when large investments have to be 
diverted – in a relatively short time frame – from well-known technologies to ones that have associated 
higher technological risks. If risks and distributional issues will be managed appropriately, the amount of 
resources to be mobilized is not of an unprecedented size. 
 
                                                 
17 Data are from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Hydropower Association and the 
World Wind Energy Association. 
18 Figure expressed in 2006 USD. Source: Al Neuharth (2006-06-23), “Traveling Interstates is our Sixth Freedom,” 
USA TODAY.   16 
 
Table 5 Cumulative investment in the power sector by region 2005-2050 (Billion 2005 USD) 
(a) Reference scenario 

























Total  OECD  886  2060 2342 2606 2851  5288  49.3  5457  42.5  10746  45.6 
Total Non OECD  734  2024  2689  3367  4031  5447  50.7  7398  57.5  12845  54.4 
Total  World  1620  4084  5031  5973  6882  10735 100 12855 100 23590 100 
Annual  Average 324 408 503 597 688  429      643      524     
(b) 550 ppm CC scenario 

























Total  OECD  763  2076 2631 2921 3071  5470  52.3  5992  45.7  11463  48.6 
Total Non OECD  681  1686  2622  3323  3795  4989  47.7  7118  54.3  12107  51.4 
Total  World  1444  3762  5254  6244  6866  10460 100 13110 100 23570 100 
Annual  Average 289 376 525 624 687  418      656      524     
(c) 550 ppm CC-Reference 
  2005-2010 2010-2020 2020-2030 2030-2040 2040-2050 Total  2005-2030 Total  2030-2050 Total  2005-2050
USA -74  10  152  165  125  88.6  290.2  378.8 
EUROPE -15  46  119  141  129  149.7  269.7  419.3 
Other OECD  -33  -41  18  10  -34  -56.1  -24.8  -80.9 
Total OECD  -123  15  290  315  220  182.1  535.1  717.3 
China -21  -188  -32  -7  -145  -240.2  -151.5  -391.7 
Transition Economies  -13  -24  8  30  -8  -28.6  22.8  -5.8 
Other Non OECD  -20  -126  -43  -68  -84  -188.9  -151.4  -340.3 
Total Non OECD  -53  -338  -67  -44  -236  -457.7  -280.1  -737.8 
Total World  -176  -323  223  271  -16  -276  255  -21 

































Total 2005-2030 Total 2030-2050 Total 2005-2050
Figure 5 Cumulative investment differential in the power sector by region, 2005-2050 (550 ppm 
CC-Reference) 
 
4. Financing Innovation 
 
Radical transformations in the power sector and in the energy sector in general will be necessary but not 
sufficient to achieve a low-carbon world. They must be necessarily complemented by economy-wide large 
energy efficiency improvements to achieve the drastic reductions of emissions implied by low stabilization 
targets. Actually, since decarbonization measures are typically expensive, there is a wide agreement on the 
fact that energy efficiency must be the first area of intervention and will probably remain the most important 
for several decades. The scenarios produced by the WITCH model show that in 2020 it would be optimal to 
increase energy efficiency by 31 per cent while the carbon content of energy would decrease by only 5 per 
cent. This pattern will continue for decades and in 2050 the cumulated optimal improvement of energy 
efficiency is 70 per cent while the optimal contraction of the carbon content of energy is only 45 per cent 
(see Table 2). 
 
Energy efficiency improvements can be achieved in WITCH by changing the optimal mix of capital, labor 
and energy services – the three major inputs in the aggregate production function of the model – and by 
investing in a stock of knowledge that increases the amount of energy services delivered by each unit of 
energy used. While the first mechanism describes process innovations in production and consumption, the 
second mechanism describes improvements in end-use equipment. Investments in R&D to increase the 
productivity of energy are thus needed in first instance to stimulate technological innovation in end-use 
energy technologies. 
 
The decarbonization of the energy sector will be the result of the penetration of power generation 
technologies with low- or zero-carbon emissions and it will follow a gradual decarbonization of final energy 
consumption, in particular energy used for transport and for heating. In WITCH a representative carbon-free 
fuel and a representative carbon-free, large scale, electricity generation technology, become available if 
sufficient investments in R&D are made. The higher is the investment in R&D, the lower is the cost of this 
backstop technologies and the faster the substitution of natural gas, oil and coal in final consumption, and of 
Other Non 
OECD   18
fossil fuels based electricity generation in the power sector.
19 Thus, R&D contributes both to increase energy 
efficiency and to de-carbonize energy in WITCH. 
 
A rich description of technological dynamics allows to produce more accurate scenarios of investments. In 
particular, models without endogenous technical change would overestimate the incremental investment over 
a Reference scenario. In order to appreciate this point, we produce an hypothetical scenario (550 ppm R&D 
fixed) in which R&D investments are fixed to the level they have in the Reference scenario. With reduced 
opportunities to increase energy efficiency and to decarbonize final energy consumption, the international 
carbon price will be higher and climate policy will be more costly (Figure 6 and Figure 7). Higher electricity 
demand requires higher installed capacity in the power sector, especially in more expensive power plants 
with low- or zero-carbon emissions, due to the limited possibilities of decarbonizing final energy uses. As a 
consequence, the percentage of investments directed to the energy sector is higher when R&D investments 
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Figure 6. Price of Carbon 2005-2050 
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Figure 7. Discounted Stabilization Policy Costs (3% 
declining): 2005-2050 
Figure 8. Investment in the Energy Sector as % of Total 
Investment 
 
Figure 9 displays the time path of global R&D investments in the three knowledge stocks as a fraction of 
gross world product (GWP) and in absolute level for three different scenarios. If we compare the standard 
unconstrained 550 ppm CC scenario, with the Reference scenario, we see that the model finds optimal to 
scale-up energy-related R&D investments five-fold, from the very beginning of climate policy. 
                                                 
19 Investments in R&D are endogenous and augment three independent knowledge stocks. International energy R&D 
spillovers link regional technological advances. The cost of the backstop fuel follows a two-factors learning curve 
(Bosetti et al, 2009d). The cost of wind and solar power plants follows a one-factor learning curve with lagged 
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Figure 9 Total R&D investment under different scenarios 
 
The increase of R&D spending is massive and prolonged until 2050; in relative terms, there is a spike in the 
first decades and then we register a stable pattern of R&D spending over GWP. The spike in R&D spending 
in the first years is explained by the sudden massive investment in research to develop the backstop fuel 
(Table 6). 
 
The amount of R&D spending is a function of the technological scenario that we use. In a Constrained Policy 
scenario (550 ppm constraints), in which nuclear electricity is bound to current generation levels (e.g. for 
safety or political reasons) and the penetration of renewable power generation is limited to at most 25 per 
cent of total electricity supply (e.g. for distribution, transmission and intermittency problems), R&D 
investments increase with respect to the 550 ppm CC scenario (see again Figure 9). With constraints to 
nuclear and renewables, it is in fact optimal to invest in R&D to develop a carbon-free backstop power 
generation technology capable of operating on a large scale (see Table 6). 
 
   Table 6 R&D Investment (Billion 2005 USD) 
   No limit  Limit on nuclear and renewables 












2020 6.22  33.49 --  7.09  33.26  7.08 
2030 11.05  29.65  --  12.23  29.27  5.57  OECD 
2050 23.73  28.44  --  25.67  28.05  5.59 
2020 1.70  25.61 --  1.84  25.54  4.86 
2030 3.70  27.85 --  3.97  27.55  4.00  Non  
OECD  2050 10.59  33.35  --  11.33  33.00  5.02 
2020 7.91  59.08 --  8.93  58.80  11.93 
2030 14.76  57.50  --  16.20  56.82  9.56  World 
2050 34.31  61.79  --  37.01  61.06  10.61 
 
Our scenarios have useful insights for policy makers. They show that despite the financial flows needed to 
boost R&D activities are modest from a macroeconomic perspective (at most 0.14 per cent of GWP), the fast 
expansion of R&D spending represents a formidable challenge from a managerial perspective. Our 
economies will be perfectly able to finance the expansion in energy related R&D expenditure. A real threat 
comes instead from the impressive effort needed to mobilize these financial resources in a short time. We 
must also consider that governments’ support will probably be necessary to fund research in backstop 
technologies for three reasons. First, private investors might not be willing to undertake the high risks of 
frontier research. Second, knowledge market externalities are a well-known problem that is particularly acute 
for the basic research activity needed to develop breakthrough technologies. Finally, especially for a 
backstop power generation technology, large scale projects will be costly and will require the partnership of   20
many governments (i.e. the large scale collider at CERN cost Euro 3 billion and it involved 20 member states 
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Non-electricity backstop Total R&D Inv left axis  
Figure 10 USA Total R&D investment 
 
With a strong political commitment there are chances however that these difficulties can be overcome. In 
fact, in the past, vast amounts of resources have already been successfully mobilized to finance ambitious 
technological advancements in a short time frame. For example, in the 1960s the Apollo Space Programme 
of the NASA has required a massive investment that is comparable to what would be necessary to spend to 
develop a backstop fuel in the United States (Figure 10). To send a man on the moon the NASA spent 
approximately 97.9 billion of USD, at 2008 prices, over 13 years, which reaches the 0.4 per cent of the 
average national GDP during the peak year of funding (Stine, 2009). In GDP terms this is much less than 




























USA R&D Investment Other OECD R&D Investment EU R&D Investment
USA Auctioning Revenue Other OECD Auctioning Revenue EU Auctioning Revenue



























USA R&D Investment Other OECD R&D Investment EU R&D Investment
USA Auctioning Revenue Other OECD Auctioning Revenue EU Auctioning Revenue
Carbon price (USD / t CO2) 12.7 33.3 75.5 160.3 253.8
 
Figure 11 Stabilization Scenario: Auctioning revenue (20% auctioned) and R&D investments 
 
Revenues from auctioning carbon allowances – or fiscal revenues from carbon taxes – can be a major source 
of income for R&D investments. This is a widely discussed idea that we can test using the scenarios for 
R&D expenditures and the price of carbon allowances that clears the international carbon market in WITCH. 
We start by assuming that 20 percent of carbon allowances are auctioned in all regions. The growing price of 
carbon quickly generates a flow of income sufficient to cover all R&D investments in advanced economies 
starting from 2020 (Figure 11). After 2020 the revenues from auctioning will largely exceed the demand of 
funds to cover energy related R&D. Most interestingly, we can compute the exact share of permits that is 
necessary to auction to cover investments in R&D in the USA, in Europe and in other OECD economies. 
                                                 
20 http://askanexpert.web.cern.ch/AskAnExpert/en/Accelerators/LHCgeneral-en.html#3 and 
http://www.lhc.ac.uk/about-the-lhc/faqs.html viewed on November 30
th 2009.   21
Initially, the low-carbon price and the high spending in R&D require about three quarters of permits to be 
auctioned for this purpose. This share declines quickly to a modest 5 per cent in 2030, as shown by Table 7, 
for all three regions, mainly because the carbon price will increase substantially after 2020. To put these 
figures in perspective for the USA, the 22 billion from auctioning permits are roughly equivalent to 5 per 
cent of the total 2007 USA corporate tax revenue.
21 
 
This simple exercise yields an interesting policy insight. Revenues from auctioning carbon allowances or 
from carbon taxes should initially be devoted almost exclusively to finance R&D. There are other 
noteworthy options for recycling carbon revenues – for example lump-sum transfers to low income 
households would reduce the regressive component of carbon pricing – but a dispersed re-distribution of 
carbon revenues would miss the opportunity to create a large R&D fund that has the chance of financing the 
breakthroughs towards a low-carbon world. 
 
Table 7 Weighing auctioned revenue and R&D investments 





R&D investments = 
auctioning revenue 




R&D investments = 
auctioning revenue 




R&D investments = 
auctioning revenue 
(Billion 2005 USD) 
2010  76% 48.128 71% 21.906 75% 15.296 
2015  28% 51.151 27% 22.453 27% 15.494 
2020  14% 49.917 13% 21.278 13% 15.380 
2025  9% 50.634 8% 21.541 8% 15.540 
2030  5% 53.686 5% 23.005 5% 16.270 
 
5. The Carbon Market: from “Fossil Finance” to “Carbon Finance” 
 
If a successful, stringent, long-term mitigation policy will be implemented, the twenty-first century will see 
the emergence of a new key commodity, carbon, whose value will increase considerably over time. At the 
same time, this century will witness and an historic decline of oil, natural gas and coal markets, three major 
international commodities for centuries. In particular, the oil market will likely evanish during the century, 
long before oil is exhausted, because its consumption is more dispersed than coal and natural gas and there is 
no technology to capture and store carbon from diffused emissions. All models unanimously confirm this 
scenario. The question is rather when and at what pace the oil market will start to disappear. 
 
This section is devoted to a comparative analysis of the dynamics of financial flows associated to carbon – 
“carbon finance” – and of financial flows associated to fossil fuels – “fossil finance” – during the transition 
towards a low-carbon world. 
 
According to our Policy scenario, an hypothetical world carbon market will be larger than the future oil 
market by a factor of six by the middle of the century, with the take-over happening between 2035 to 2040. 
This rough estimate is obtained considering the primary markets alone. Financial transactions connected to 
carbon trade will grow in value for the combined effect of larger exchange of carbon permits and growing 
carbon prices.
22 Assuming that the share of oil traded internationally is fifty percent, the financial flows 
associated to oil transactions will decline for a contraction of demand and for lower oil prices. Keeping 
carbon in the ground will in fact be a more profitable business than extracting fossil fuels. Even in the case of 
fragmented carbon markets – or if the policy tool will be a carbon tax – the value of carbon will be higher 
than the value oil and other fossil fuels (Figure 12). 
 
                                                 
21 Bureau of Economic Analysis: Government Current Receipts and Expenditures 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/GovView.asp. view on October 2009. 
22 Our estimate, based on the standard Policy scenario in which carbon allowances are distributed according to the 
“contraction and convergence” rule, is obtained by simply multiplying the value of carbon by the quantity traded 
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Figure 12 Oil and carbon market value in 550 ppm CO2e scenario 
 
The size of an hypothetical future world carbon market will depend on the international distribution of 
carbon allowances: the greater will be the unbalance between the level of emissions and the endowment of 
permits, the greater will be the incentive to use international offsets to achieve the domestic targets. The 
value of carbon will change instead only marginally with different allocation rules, being it primarily a 
function of both the severity of the stabilization target and technological progress. The degree of openness of 
the international carbon market, by influencing the efficiency of global abatement, will also have an impact 
on carbon prices. 
 
We explore these issues using a set of Policy scenarios developed by the WITCH model with different 
emissions permits allocation rules and a variety assumptions on the degree of openness of the international 
carbon market. 
 
The  550 ppm CC Policy scenario used the “contraction-and-convergence” rule to distribute emissions 
permits internationally. A second possibility would be to distribute emissions permits in proportion to 
population right from the beginning of climate policy, without the adjustment period which characterizes the 
“contraction-and-convergence” rule. This second scheme is referred to in the literature as the “equal-per-
capita” (EPC) distribution rule and we use it in the 550 ppm EPC scenario. 
 
We explore the implications of limiting international carbon offsets using the contraction-and-convergence 
rule. While in the standard Policy scenario (550 ppm CC) regions have free access to the international carbon 
market, we developed three scenarios – 550 ppm CC 25 %, 550 ppm CC 50%, 550 ppm CC 75% –in which 
we limit the purchase of international offsets to 25 per cent, 50 per cent and 75 per cent of the national 
abatement target. 
 
Although informative, scenarios with limited access to international carbon market have little chances of 
being implemented because they would raise domestic abatement costs. For example, the European ETS II-
III phases (2008-2020) and the recently proposed USA Waxman-Markey bill, have both very lax constraints: 
the European Union will limit international carbon offsets to 1.6-1.7 billion tons of CO2 in the period 2008-
2020, while the Waxman-Markey bill limits international offsets to one billion tons of CO2 annually, with an 
extra billion ton of domestic offsets.
23 Not surprisingly, both constraints are not binding until 2025 according 
to our Policy scenarios. If we look at Figure 13, we see that in case of unlimited access to international 
carbon markets Europe will make one billion tons of CO2 international offsets, largely below the limit 
                                                 
23 http://ec.europa.eu/energy/climate_actions/doc/2008_res_ia_en.pdf and 
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090724/hr2454_housesummary.pdf view on November 2009   23
imposed by the current legislation. With different assumptions on openness of international carbon markets, 
the use of offsets might increase, not exceeding however the limit of 1.7 cumulative billion tons. For the 
USA, the Waxman-Markey limit of one billion tons of CO2 per year will become stringent only after 2025, 
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Figure 13 Cumulative international offsets, 
Europe (2010-2020)  Figure 14 International offsets, USA 
 
 
With both allocation rules (550 ppm CC and 550 ppm EPC) and unlimited access to international offsets, the 
value of the carbon market will increase exponentially over the time, reaching more than USD 3.5 trillion in 
2050, when the two allocation rules converge (Figure 15). With limited access to international offsets the 
value of carbon markets will be smaller because of the combined effect of reduced trading volume and lower 
carbon value. Only in the 550 ppm CC 25% scenario the value of the carbon market stops increasing after 
2030. 
 
The most important factor influencing the size of the international carbon market is the allocation rule used 
to distribute emissions permits. While in the equal-per-capita allocation rule the largest fraction of global 
emission permits is distributed to low income-high population regions, with very low per capita emissions 
and thus low abatement targets, in the contraction-and-convergence rule, permits tend to be distributed, 
especially in the first decades, where emissions are, thus limiting the need to use international offsets. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the 550 ppm EPC scenario displays a much higher volume of international 
carbon offsets, as shown in Figure 16. The limits to the access to international offsets become binding after 












































550 ppm CC 25% 550 ppm CC 50% 550 ppm CC 75% 550 ppm CC 550 ppm EPC
Figure 15 Carbon market value  Figure 16 Carbon market volume 
 
With limits to international offsets marginal abatement costs are not equated globally. With competitive 
markets, the greater is the restriction to trade, the lower is size of the market and the price of carbon, as 
shown by Figure 17. This happens because when offsets are bounded, only the cheapest abatement 
opportunities are financed, leaving unexploited the most expensive. Accordingly, with limited international 
offsets the price of carbon becomes an imperfect signal of the severity of climate policy: although the price 
of carbon is lower with limited access to international offsets, climate policy costs increase, as detailed in 
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Figure 18 Discounted Stabilization Policy Costs (3% declining) (2005-2050) 
 
Constraints to international carbon offsets reduce the overall efficiency of climate policy and increase costs 
for all regions. Costs in Non OECD countries are more sensitive to assumptions on the openness of carbon 
markets than costs in OECD countries. This is explained by the loss of large financial inflows from carbon 
offsets in some developing regions, especially in South Asia (SASIA) – which includes India – and in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA), both with low emissions and large population. 
 
When limits on international carbon offsets are stringent, regions with a deficit of carbon permits will have 
higher marginal abatement costs because a larger fraction of abatement is domestic. Indeed, for these 
regions, the domestic shadow price of carbon will be higher than the international one (the reverse will be 
true for countries with an abundant allocation of permits). An interesting implication is that investments to 
decarbonize the energy sector will increase, as depicted in Figure 19 for the USA and Europe. When the 
limit on international carbon offsets becomes stringent, optimal investments in the energy sector increase 
roughly by 25 per cent in Europe and between 25 per cent and 30 per cent in the USA, with respect to the 
Policy scenario without constraints (550 ppm CC). Hence, the carbon market could act as a tangible indirect 
source of investments in the energy sector. 
 
A crucial question is if the financial flows associated to the international carbon offsets are sustainable from 
a political and an international macroeconomic point of view. Notes: 
CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zealand); USA; LACA (Latin America, Mexico and Caribbean); WEURO (Western Europe); EEURO (Estern 
Europe); MENA (Middle East and North Africa); SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa); TE (Transition Economies); SASIA (South Asia); 
CHINA (including Taiwan); EASIA (South East Asia); KOSAU (Korea, South Africa, Australia) displays a regional breakdown of 
financial flows associated to carbon trading under different degrees of openness of the carbon market. 
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Figure 19 Change in Energy Investment when International Offsets are Limited 
 
With unrestricted access to international offsets Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia (SASIA) are the 
two large suppliers of cheap abatement options; with growing carbon prices the financial inflow in these two 
regions would be 25 per cent and 11 per cent of annual regional GDP in 2050. Especially for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, selling carbon permits would become the major economic activity. In 2020, when the carbon price is 
still very low and the demand of permits from developed regions is low in the realm of a contraction-and-
convergence rule, the transfer to Sub-Saharan Africa would be around USD 18 billion in all scenarios. In 
order to put these figures in perspective, we should consider that in 2007 the net Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) to Africa amounted to USD 38.7 (DID, 2009) and thus carbon trade would become a 
primary source of revenues for low income countries. 
 
However, huge financial flows would disrupt the balance of payments of low income regions and cause other 
serious macroeconomic disruptions (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2006). From a political standpoint, it is hard 
to imagine that extremely large financial flows will be accepted by high income countries. It is thus perfectly 
reasonable to expect a limit to international carbon offsets in the future, when carbon price becomes to 
increase sharply. A threshold of about 25 per cent is a realistic option from a financial perspective but it 
leads to a doubling of mitigation policy costs (Figure 18). A looser target might then be preferable and a 
wider access to carbon finance can be compensated with correction measures to avoid large financial 









































































































































































































































































(d) 550 ppm CC 25% 
Figure 20. Trading value in absolute and as % of GDP 
Notes: 
CAJANZ (Canada, Japan, New Zealand); USA; LACA (Latin America, Mexico and Caribbean); WEURO (Western Europe); EEURO (Estern Europe); 
MENA (Middle East and North Africa); SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa excl. South Africa); TE (Transition Economies); SASIA (South Asia); CHINA 
(including Taiwan); EASIA (South East Asia); KOSAU (Korea, South Africa, Australia) 
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Conclusions 
In study we have investigated investments and financial flows induced by mitigation policy aimed at 
stabilizing GHG concentration at 550 ppm CO2-eq at the end of the present century. In particular, we explore 
what are implications of the stabilization policy for investments in the power generation sector, the financial 
requirements to foster R&D activities and the dynamics of carbon markets 
 
We find that climate policy will not induce higher investments in electric power generation with respect to 
the Reference scenario. It is true that zero- or low- carbon emitting power generation technologies are more 
expensive than traditional coal and natural gas power plants, but it must also be acknowledged that in many 
cases it will be cheaper to reduce electricity demand than invest in these expensive technologies. In fact, we 
find that higher average investment costs in electricity generation are totally offset by a contraction of 
electricity demand. Thus, a low-carbon world does not require higher investments but rather to shift 
resources towards a totally new technological mix. Criticalities will emerge when large investments have to 
be diverted – in a relatively short time frame – towards intrinsically complex and risky technologies. 
However, if these risks will be managed appropriately the amount of resources to be mobilized is not of an 
unprecedented size. 
 
Similar issues emerge when we look at the financial requirements to sustain a technological revolution in the 
energy sector. A large number of scenarios produced using the WITCH model consistently show that it 
would be optimal to scale-up energy-related R&D expenditures from the very beginning of climate policy. 
R&D should be directed to increase energy efficiency and to develop and deploy zero emissions backstop 
technologies. This fast expansion of R&D spending represents a formidable challenge from a managerial 
perspective, but the overall financial requirements are minimal, summing up to a fraction of a percentage 
point of gross world product. Thus, from a pure financial perspective our economies will be perfectly able to 
finance this historical expansion in energy related R&D expenditure. The real threats come instead from the 
impressive managerial effort needed to mobilize such a large scale effort in a short time and from the well 
known failures in innovation markets. Governments will necessarily step in to support R&D, especially in 
large scale, very uncertain, projects. Public budgets problems can be eased using revenues from carbon taxes 
or from auctioning carbon allowances. The size of funds from carbon pricing will be large enough to finance 
R&D expenditure from the first years of climate policy. 
 
If a successful, stringent, long-term, mitigation policy will be put into place, the twenty-first century will see 
the emergence of carbon finance and an historic decline of oil, natural gas and coal markets. As a pure 
reference scenario, we show that a hypothetic world carbon market will be larger than the future oil market 
by a factor of six by the middle of the century, with the take-over between 2035 and 2040. Moreover, in the 
case of fragmented or national carbon markets – or if the policy tool will be a carbon tax – the value 
associated to carbon will be higher than the value associated to oil and other fossil fuels: keeping carbon in 




Bosetti, V., C. Carraro and E. Massetti (2009a). “Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and Distributional 
Effects.” Journal of Policy Modeling, May-June 2009, 31(3): 382-403. 
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, E. De Cian, R. Duval, E. Massetti and M. Tavoni (2009b). “The Incentives to 
Participate in and the Stability of International Climate Coalitions: a Game Theoretic Approach Using the 
WITCH Model.” OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 702, June 2009. 
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, E. Massetti, A. Sgobbi and M. Tavoni (2009c). “Optimal Energy Investment and 
R&D Strategies to Stabilise Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Concentrations.” Resource and Energy 
Economics, 31(2): 123-137. 
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, M. Galeotti, E. Massetti and M. Tavoni (2006). “WITCH: A World Induced 
Technical Change Hybrid Model.” The Energy Journal, Special Issue. Hybrid Modelling of Energy-
Environment Policies: Reconciling Bottom-up and Top-down, December 2006: 13-38. 
Bosetti, V., C. Carraro, R. Duval, A. Sgobbi and M. Tavoni (2009d). “The Role of R&D and Technology 
Diffusion in Climate Change Mitigation: New Perspectives using the WITCH Model.” OECD Economics 
Department Working Paper No. 664, February 2009. 
Bosetti, V., E. Decian, A. Sgobbi and M. Tavoni (2009e). “The 2008 WITCH Model: New Model Features 
and Baseline.” FEEM Working Paper 85.09 . 
Bosetti, V., E. Massetti and M. Tavoni (2007). “The WITCH Model. Structure, Baseline, Solutions.” FEEM 
Working Paper 10.07 . 
Carraro, C. and E. Massetti (2009). “The Improbabile 2°C Target.” Voxeu.org, September 3, 2009. 
Clarke, L.E., J.A. Edmonds, V. Krey, R.G. Richels, S. Rose, and M. Tavoni (2010). “International Climate 
Policy Architectures: Overview of the EMF22 International Scenarios.” Forthcoming Energy Economics. 
Criqui, P. (2001). “POLES Prospective Outlook on Long-term Energy Systems.” Institut d’economie et de 
Politique de l’energies, Upmf-Grenoble. 
Department for International Development (2009). “Millennium Development Goal 8: To develop a global 
partnership for development.” Official Development Assistance, March 2009. 
Edenhofer, O., C. Carraro, J.-C. Hourcade, K. Neuhoff, G. Luderer, C. Flachsland, M. Jakob, A. Popp, J. 
Steckel, J. Strohschein, N. Bauer, S. Brunner, M. Leimbach, H. Lotze-Campen, V. Bosetti, E. de Cian, M. 
Tavoni, O. Sassi, H. Waisman, R. Crassous-Doerfler, S. Monjon, S. Dröge, H. van Essen, P. del Río, A. Türk 
(2009). “RECIPE - The Economics of Decarbonization.” Synthesis Report, Nov 2009. 
European Commission (COM(2009) 475). “Stepping Up International Climate Finance: A European 
Blueprint for the Copenhagen Deal.” Brussels, September 2009. 
European Commission (SEC(2009) 101). “Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication the 
Communication from the Commission Towards a comprehensive climate change agreement in 
Copenhagen.” Brussels, 28 January 2009. 
European Commission (SEC(2009) 1172). “Staff Working Document accompanying the Communication 
from the Commission Stepping up international climate finance: A European blueprint from the Copenhagen 
Deal.” Brussels, September 2009. 
Forster, P., V. Ramaswamy, P. Artaxo, T. Berntsen, R. Betts, D.W. Fahey, J. Haywood, J. Lean, D.C. Lowe, 
G. Myhre, J. Nganga, R. Prinn, G. Raga, M. Schulz and R. Van Dorland, 2007: Changes in Atmospheric 
Constituents and in Radiative Forcing. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
[Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
International Energy Agency (2008). “World Energy Outlook 2008.” International Energy Agency, Paris.   29
International Energy Agency (2009). “How the Energy Sector Can Deliver on a Climate Agreement in 
Copenhagen. Special Early Excerpt of the World Energy Outlook 2009 for the Bangkok UNFCCC Meeting.” 
OECD/IEA, October 2009. 
Massetti, E. and R. Parrado (2009). “Regional Energy Sector Dynamics: a Model Comparison Exercise.” 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, October 2009, mimeo. 
McKibbin, W.J. and P.J. Wilcoxen (2006). “The Role of Economics in Climate Change Policy.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 16(2): 107–129. 
McKinsey (2009). “Pathways to a Low-Carbon Economy. Version 2 of the Global Greenhouse Gas 
Abatement Cost Curve.” McKinsey, January 2009. 
Meehl, G.A., T.F. Stocker, W.D. Collins, P. Friedlingstein, A.T. Gaye, J.M. Gregory, A. Kitoh, R. Knutti, 
J.M. Murphy, A. Noda, S.C.B. Raper, I.G. Watterson, A.J. Weaver and Z.-C. Zhao, 2007: Global Climate 
Projections. In: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. 
Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
Russ, P., J.-C. Ciscar, B. Saveyn, A. Soria, L. Szábó, T. Van Ierland, D. Van Regemorter and R. Virdis 
(2009). “Economic Assessment of Post-2012 Global Climate Policies. Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Reduction Scenarios with the POLES and GEM-E3 Models.” JRC/IPTS, February 2009. 
Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, R.B. Alley, T. Berntsen, N.L. Bindoff, Z. Chen, A. Chidthaisong, J.M. 
Gregory, G.C. Hegerl, M. Heimann, B. Hewitson, B.J. Hoskins, F. Joos, J. Jouzel, V. Kattsov, U. Lohmann, 
T. Matsuno, M. Molina, N. Nicholls, J. Overpeck, G. Raga, V. Ramaswamy, J. Ren, M. Rusticucci, R. 
Somerville, T.F. Stocker, P. Whetton, R.A. Wood and D. Wratt, 2007: Technical Summary. In: Climate 
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. 
Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
Stine D. D. (2009). “The Manhattan Project, the Apollo Program, and Federal Energy Technology R&D 
Programs: A Comparative Analysis.” Specialist in Science and Technology Policy, Congressional Research 
Service7-5700, 30 June 2009. 
UNFCCC secretariat (2007). “Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change”. 
Weitzman, M. (2009). “On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic Climate Change.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(1): 1-19.  NOTE DI LAVORO DELLA FONDAZIONE ENI ENRICO MATTEI 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 











NOTE DI LAVORO PUBLISHED IN 2010 
GC  1.2010  Cristina Cattaneo: Migrants’ International Transfers and Educational Expenditure: Empirical Evidence from 
Albania 
SD  2.2010  Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Phoebe Koundouri: Tradable Permits vs Ecological Dumping 
SD  3.2010  Fabio Antoniou, Panos Hatzipanayotou and Phoebe Koundouri: Second Best Environmental Policies under 
Uncertainty 
SD  4.2010  Carlo Carraro, Enrica De Cian and Lea Nicita: Modeling Biased Technical Change. Implications for Climate 
Policy 
IM  5.2010  Luca Di Corato: Profit Sharing under the threat of Nationalization  
SD  6.2010  Masako Ikefuji, Jun-ichi Itaya and Makoto Okamura: Optimal Emission Tax with Endogenous Location 
Choice of Duopolistic Firms 
SD  7.2010  Michela Catenacci and Carlo Gipponi: Potentials and Limits of Bayesian Networks to Deal with Uncertainty 
in the Assessment of Climate Change Adaptation Policies 
GC  8.2010  Paul Sarfo-Mensah and William Oduro: Changes in Beliefs and Perceptions about the Natural Environment 
in the Forest-Savanna Transitional Zone of Ghana: The Influence of Religion 
IM  9.2010  Andrea Boitani, Marcella Nicolini and Carlo Scarpa: Do Competition and Ownership Matter? Evidence from 
Local Public Transport in Europe 
SD  10.2010  Helen Ding and Paulo A.L.D. Nunes and Sonja Teelucksingh: European Forests and Carbon Sequestration 
Services : An Economic Assessment of Climate Change Impacts 
GC  11.2010  Enrico Bertacchini, Walter Santagata and Giovanni Signorello: Loving Cultural Heritage Private Individual 
Giving and Prosocial Behavior 
SD  12.2010  Antoine Dechezleprêtre, Matthieu Glachant and Yann Ménière: What Drives the International Transfer of 
Climate Change Mitigation Technologies? Empirical Evidence from Patent Data 
SD  13.2010  Andrea Bastianin, Alice Favero and Emanuele Massetti: Investments and Financial Flows Induced by Climate 
Mitigation Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 